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I. INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS),1 invoked by human rights advocates as a
dynamic means of enforcing customary international law (international
law),2 permits aliens (non-U.S. citizens) to file civil claims in U.S. courts for
violations of international law.3 Not all violations of international law are
cognizable under the ATS; only misconduct that exhibits a particularly
identifiable and strong transnational dimension (e.g., impacting the mutual
interests of nations) and that is sufficiently egregious is actionable pursuant
to the ATS.4 The type of misconduct alleged usually involves human rights
abuses.5 As a type of litigation that touches a spectrum of issues, including
corporate governance, international law, and complex human rights issues,
ATS litigation has engendered intense analysis and spirited scholarship.6
1
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”). The terms Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Alien Tort
Claims Act refer to the same statute and are used interchangeably in literature about the topic.
This Article references it as the ATS.
2
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 116 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In this
opinion we use the terms ‘law of nations’ and ‘customary international law’
interchangeably.”); see also David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the
Domestic Status of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 486–87 (2010) (“The statute has
provided the practical context in which the debate over [customary international law]’s
domestic status has occurred.”). While often relied upon in the human rights context, the ATS
was originally utilized and is equally valid in commercial contexts. Matt. A. Vega, Balancing
Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational Corporations Are Liable for
Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 393–94, 429, 447 (2010).
3
28 U.S.C. § 1350. The full text of the ATS reads: “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id.
4
See Joel Slawotsky, The New Global Financial Landscape: Why Egregious International
Corporate Fraud Should Be Cognizable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 131, 132 (2006) (explaining that only claims that implicate the “mutual concern of
the nations of the world” are permitted under the statute); see also id. at 154 n.163 (quoting
case law that notes the transnational and egregious elements).
5
However, the statute itself does not limit the type of conduct. See Vega, supra note 2, at
388 (opining that global bribery may be cognizable under the ATS).
6
See, e.g., M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original
Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 316 (2009) (discussing the
difference between the definitions of “foreigner” and “alien” as it relates to the ATS); Lucien
J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational Enterprise:
Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 3 (2003) (suggesting
that courts confronted with ATS claims have provided adequate guidance to global
corporations); Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones:
How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52 HARV. INT’L
L.J. ONLINE 119 (2010), http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/11/online_52_giannini_farbstein/
(examining the effect that a recent ATS case may have on corporate accountability in conflict
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For more than two decades, U.S. courts have held that, in addition to
individuals,7 private corporations owe duties under customary international
law and have liability under the statute.8 In recent years, corporations have
become prime defendants and the focus of ATS litigation.9 Clearly,
presuming that they may face potential liability under the ATS, corporations
have both settled and proceeded to trial, rather than moving to dismiss.10
Both Yahoo!11 and Shell Oil12 settled ATS suits filed against them, while
Chevron13 and Drummond Corporation14 proceeded to trial and obtained
defense verdicts.
zones); Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353 (2011) (challenging the view
that the ATS imposes liability on corporations for violations of customary international law);
Moore, supra note 2, at 486–87; Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human
Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2007) (noting that
ATS litigation “is the most prominent and effective means for litigating international human
rights claims”); Slawotsky, supra note 4 (arguing that the default of not recognizing ATS
claims related to financial fraud is no longer valid); Vega, supra note 2 (arguing that an alien
should be able to bring an ATS claim for personal or economic injuries based upon foreign
bribery).
7
See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
district court had jurisdiction over former Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos under the
Alien Tort Act and that “ ‘[t]he prohibition against official torture carries with it the force of a jus
cogens norm, which enjoys the highest status within international law’ ” (citation omitted)).
8
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2000)
(subjecting two foreign holdings companies to jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act);
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999) (“No logical reason exists
for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability for universally condemned
violations of international law merely because they were not acting under color of law.”).
9
See, e.g., Doe v. Nestlé, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (labor abuses on
cocoa plantations); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3541 (2010) (pharmaceutical testing on children without informed consent in Nigeria);
Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families: Firm Gave Officials Dissidents’ EMails, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at D04 (disclosure of political dissidents’ e-mail records
in China); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (provision of
vehicles and spare parts to apartheid South Africa).
10
See Rod Khavari, Comment, Executive Order 13303: Is the Bush Administration
Choosing Corporations over Human Rights Actions Instituted via the Alien Tort Claims Act?,
14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 119, 129 (2006) (“Transnational corporations and the U.S.
government have felt that the [ATS] is an awakening monster, threatening corporations and
their investments as opposed to being the savior for human rights victims and survivors.”).
11
Rampell, supra note 9.
12
Jad Mouawad, Shell Agrees to Settle Abuse Case for Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009,
at B1.
13
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (“These plaintiffs
brought claims under the [ATS], Nigerian law, and California law. The jury rendered a
verdict in favor of Chevron on all claims, and Plaintiffs now appeal. . . . We . . . affirm the
district court’s judgment.”).
14
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ne claim for relief
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Overturning its precedent,15 the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.—a virtual earthquake of an opinion—held that corporations
do not have obligations under international law and, thus, cannot have
liability under the ATS.16 In Kiobel, the majority held that pursuant to
Supreme Court ordered guidance in the Sosa opinion,17 federal courts are to
examine international law to decide the question of whether that “ ‘law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued.’ ”18 The Kiobel court, relying upon that footnote,
examining international law, and citing to international criminal tribunals,19
treaties,20 and scholarship,21 found such law did not encompass corporate
liability.22 The court held “[f]rom the beginning . . . the principle of
individual liability for violations of international law has been limited to
natural persons—not ‘juridical’ persons such as corporations.”23 According
to the Second Circuit, it is now up to Congress to decide whether the statute
can impose corporate liability, but “[f]or now, and for the foreseeable future,
the [ATS] does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over claims against
corporations.”24 Lower courts in the Second Circuit have dismissed cases
based upon the Kiobel decision.25
Taken to its logical conclusion, Kiobel holds that corporations can
conduct business any way they deem proper without concern of liability
under the statute. As noted by Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein, “the
decision create[d] unprecedented opportunities for corporate actors to shield

that Drummond aided and abetted the killings, which were war crimes, remained. At a trial of
that claim, the jury returned a verdict for Drummond. . . . We affirm.”).
15
See, e.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“On
at least nine separate occasions, the Second Circuit has addressed [ATS] cases against
corporations without ever hinting—much less holding—that such cases are barred.”).
16
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011). Judges Cabranes and Jacobs formed the majority. Id.
Judge Leval joined in the dismissal based upon a lack of evidence that the defendant acted
purposely to aid and abet the alleged wrongful conduct. Id. at 153–54. Judge Leval disagreed
with respect to corporate liability. Id. at 149–53.
17
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
18
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20).
19
Id. at 132–37.
20
Id. at 137–41.
21
Id. at 142–45.
22
Id. at 148–49.
23
Id. at 119.
24
Id. at 149.
25
See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., 447 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(disallowing underlying claims under binding Kiobel precedent).
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themselves from liability for clear abuses of international law through
incorporation.”26
Kiobel’s ruling has academic support. For example, Julian Ku supports
the Kiobel ruling and argues against corporate liability under the ATS.27 Ku
argues that international law is applicable only to states. He believes that
although individuals “may” have liability under certain limited
circumstances, corporations cannot.28 “Non-state parties, such as private
individuals, organizations, or corporations, owe duties under only domestic
laws and cannot violate international law directly.”29
Notwithstanding this scholarly support, there are compelling reasons to
conclude that corporations should have liability under the ATS. There is
nothing to indicate that corporations were excluded by the statute and the
available evidence indicates that, to the contrary, corporations were always
envisioned as part of the class of potential ATS defendants.30 In addition, the
zealous reliance by Kiobel on the Sosa footnote is misplaced. The footnote
does not stand for the proposition that federal courts should examine
international law to find whether a class of defendants, such as corporations,
can be sued under the statute. Rather, the Supreme Court merely articulated
that international law should be examined to determine whether the type of
misconduct at issue can be allocated to various actors such as public or
private entities.31 Moreover, international law does not mandate the manner
of its enforcement; such mechanisms are reserved for the individual states to
implement.

26

Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6, at 121.
Ku, supra note 6, at 354–55 (“For over two decades, U.S. courts have held that private
corporations owe duties under customary international law and can be subject to lawsuits
under the [ATS]. . . . Despite this wide support, the view that corporations can be liable for
violations of customary international law under the ATS is wrong.”). But see Roger P. Alford,
Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law Violations, 38
PEPP. L. REV. 233, 234 (2011) (“There is no question that international law grants rights and
imposes duties on entities other than states.”).
28
Ku, supra note 6, at 355 (“Indeed, customary law has only endorsed direct private-actor
liability in the context of international criminal law, and even this somewhat-uncertain
liability extends only to natural persons.”).
29
Id. at 364.
30
See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“All but one of the cases at our level hold or assume . . . that corporations can be liable.”).
31
See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 263 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The
citation to Sosa’s footnote 21 indicates only that the district court considered the views of
those governments in assessing ‘the collateral consequences that would result from finding a
new international law violation,’ and does not suffice to demonstrate that the court (again
contrary to its stated intentions) adopted sub rosa the defendants’ political question
arguments.” (citation omitted)).
27
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Regarding international law and corporate liability, the Kiobel court’s
reliance on international criminal rulings to prove corporations are not liable
under international law is misplaced because criminal law is fundamentally
different from civil tort law and the ATS is a civil liability statute.
Moreover, corporations are subject to civil law and, increasingly, criminal
law. International law unquestionably protects corporate rights, and,
therefore, corporations should be subject to obligations. Finally, the
distinction between “states” and “corporations” cited by liability opponents
is outdated and does not comport with our globalized world. The distinction
is blurred as the roles of states and corporations are interchangeable.
This Article is divided as follows: Part II provides an overview of the
ATS including a review of the recent major appellate decisions on corporate
liability. In Part III, the Article addresses the question of whether
corporations should be liable under the ATS. The Article points out that
several persuasive reasons militate in favor of finding corporate liability.
These reasons include the following: the fact that nothing in the ATS
suggests that corporations should be excluded; the absence of proof that
courts need to consult international law on the issue; the fact that
corporations do have obligations under international law; and the erosion of
the formalistic distinction between “state” actors and “private” actors. Part
IV provides a brief conclusion.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ALIEN TORT LITIGATION
The ATS provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”32 The statute allows non-U.S.
citizens to sue defendants in federal court for tortious conduct constituting a
violation of international law or a treaty. For nearly two hundred years,
relatively few cases were filed pursuant to the ATS.33 This relative
dormancy ended when, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit issued
a landmark ruling whereby the statute was relied upon to find that statesponsored torture was actionable.34 The issue in Filartiga was whether
torture constituted a “ ‘violation of the law of nations’ ” and was, thus,
cognizable under the ATS.35 For the case to be actionable, plaintiffs needed
to establish that there was an international consensus with respect to torture
32

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the dearth of cases).
34
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
35
Id. at 878 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006))).
33
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being a violation of international law.36 According to the Second Circuit, “It
is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international
accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law
violation within the meaning of the [ATS].”37
Filartiga held that, in determining whether specific conduct constitutes a
violation of international law when there are no relevant treaties or other
laws, a court should examine judicial opinions, scholarly works, and
custom.38 Significantly, the court stated that international law has to be
applied as it is used “today” and not from two hundred years prior,39 noting
that international law evolves over time.40 The Second Circuit accordingly
found that torture was a “well-established, universally recognized norm[ ] of
international law,” which was cognizable under the statute.41
After Filartiga, plaintiffs vigorously commenced filing ATS cases. Such
cases included ones against government officials alleging various human
rights abuses.42 Plaintiffs also commenced suits against corporations that
usually alleged that the defendants aided and abetted the government or
officials in violating international law.43
In Sosa, the Supreme Court held that the statute grants jurisdiction to
federal courts44 and permits them to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for a
few specific violations of international law, noting such law was part of
federal common law.45 The Court observed that at the time of its enactment
the statute was intended to encompass the three primary and
contemporaneous violations of international law: piracy, offenses against
ambassadors, and violations of safe passage.46 However, the Court endorsed
the Filartiga view that international law develops over time and held courts
were available to entertain claims for violations of “present-day law of
nations” so long as they “rest on a norm of international character accepted
by the civilized world and define with a specificity comparable to the

36

Id. at 888.
Id.
38
Id. at 880–81.
39
Id. at 881.
40
Id. at 881, 887.
41
Id. at 888.
42
See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
43
See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
44
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004).
45
Id. at 720.
46
Id.
37
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features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”47 Sosa cited
approvingly to Filartiga: “The position we take today has been assumed by
some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided
Filartiga . . . .”48 Simultaneously, the Court urged caution with respect to
embracing the types of international law violations that should be
cognizable.49 The Court provided some guidance: to come within the ambit
of the ATS, a violation should “rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th century paradigms.”50
Thus, subject to diligent gatekeeping, the federal courts were empowered
to adjudicate cases brought by aliens for violations of international law other
than the three original paradigm examples. Since the Sosa decision, a variety
of such claims have been filed, and the courts continue to grapple with many
vigorously debated issues including whether local remedies must be
exhausted prior to filing an ATS suit and whether the ATS contemplates
secondary liability (and, if so, whether the standard of liability should be
knowledge or purpose).51 Some of the litigation filed against corporations
has included: claims against a pharmaceutical company for the failure to
obtain informed medical consent for drug testing that resulted in death and
serious personal injuries;52 claims that a multinational energy company aided
and abetted a government scheme to torture and murder political dissidents;53
claims that an energy company aided and abetted crimes against humanity by
fueling military equipment used to commit these acts;54 and allegations that a
multinational high-tech corporation colluded with a government to track
down a religious group’s members who were later tortured and murdered.55
Until the Kiobel ruling, corporations were presumed by courts and litigants
to be within the sphere of potential defendants in ATS suits.56 However, the
47

Id. at 725.
Id. at 731.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 725.
51
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing, via the Kiobel concurring opinion, these debated issues).
52
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3541
(2010).
53
Mouawad, supra note 12.
54
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).
55
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 11-CV-02449,
(N.D. Cal. May 19, 2011), 2011 WL 1338057; Richard Blackden, Cisco Sued by Religious
Dissidents for Helping China Monitor Internet, TELEGRAPH (May 23, 2011), http://www.telegra
ph.co.uk/finance/china-business/8532114/Cisco-sued-by-religious-dissidents-for-helping-Chinamonitor-internet.html.
56
See supra note 8 (noting cases that have held, either implicitly or explicitly, that
48
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Kiobel ruling, discussed below, cast serious doubt as to ATS claims against
corporate defendants.
A. The Kiobel Decision: Corporations Cannot Have Liability
1. Majority Opinion
Plaintiffs, residents of the Ogoni Region of Nigeria, filed suit under the
ATS against international oil corporations for allegedly aiding and abetting
the Nigerian government in committing violations of international law.57
Purportedly, the conduct occurred during the suppression of resident protests
in the 1990s against the environmental degradation of the area.58 Defendants
were accused of aiding and abetting the conduct by providing payment, food,
and transportation to the Nigerian military.59 Plaintiffs claimed that, among
other offenses, government soldiers beat, raped, and murdered civilians.60
The Second Circuit rejected the claims against the corporate defendants
and provided a two-step analysis. First, the court referenced and adopted a
footnote in the Sosa ruling, wherein the Court stated that federal courts must
examine international law to decide the question of whether that “law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued.”61 Kiobel, thus, held that the question of whether
corporations could be liable in a U.S. court must be determined by
international law.
Second, the court evaluated international law by reviewing decisions of
international tribunals,62 treaties,63 and scholarship.64 The Kiobel ruling
found that corporate liability is not part of international law.65 The court
referenced the fact that the London Charter, which established the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (NMT),66 permitted jurisdiction
corporations may have liability under the ATS).
57
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 126 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
62
Id. at 132–37.
63
Id. at 137–41.
64
Id. at 142–45.
65
Id. at 145. This Article does not engage in a review of Kiobel’s possible misstatements
of international law. For an excellent review of those potential misunderstandings regarding
the holdings of the international tribunals, see Andrei Mamolea, The Future of Corporate
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 79, 100–11 (2011), and Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6.
66
Agreement for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Annex,
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to the tribunal only over natural persons.67 The court relied heavily upon the
fact the NMT declined to impose liability on corporations and, instead,
focused on individual liability.68 Since Nuremberg, international tribunals
have consistently sought to hold only individuals liable for violations of
international law.69 The court referenced the fact that the jurisdictions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International
Criminal Court are limited to natural persons, noting that ICTR and ICTY
charters expressly limit jurisdiction to “natural persons.”70
Kiobel also relied on the NMT’s decision to refuse the imposition of
corporate liability on I.G. Farben (Farben). The Farben entity was
referenced in Kiobel as “the most nefarious corporate enterprise known to the
civilized world.”71 Farben manufactured the agent that the German military
used to asphyxiate detainees at concentration camps.72 The majority stated:
The refusal of the [NMT] to impose liability on [Farben] is
not a matter of happenstance or oversight. This corporation’s
production of, among other things, oil, rubber, nitrates, and
fibers was harnessed to the purposes of the Nazi state, and it is
no exaggeration to assert that the corporation made possible the
war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Nazi
Germany, including its infamous programs of looting
properties of defeated nations, slave labor, and genocide.73

Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter].
67
See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 133–34 (relying significantly on the London Charter to prove that
international law is applicable only to individuals and not to corporations, basing the natural
persons argument on the Charter’s use of the terms “persons,” “individuals,” and “members”).
Id. The Court noted that the London Charter “grant[ed] the tribunal jurisdiction to ‘try and
punish persons . . . whether as individuals or as members of organizations.’ ” Id. (quoting
London Charter, supra note 66, art. 6).
68
Id. at 134–35. For a novel discussion as to the reason the NMT decided to pursue
individuals and not Farben, see infra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
69
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136.
70
Id.; see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (“The International Tribunal shall
have jurisdiction over natural persons . . . .” (emphasis added)); Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“The
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have jurisdiction over natural persons . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
71
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 134.
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The majority continued:
But [Farben] was not charged, nor was it named in the
indictment as a criminal organization. In issuing its judgment,
the [NMT] pointedly observed that “the corporate defendant,
Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be
subjected to criminal penalties in these proceedings.” The
Tribunal emphasized: “We have used the term ‘Farben’ as
descriptive of the instrumentality of cohesion in the name of
which the enumerated acts of spoliation were committed. But
corporations act through individuals and, under the conception
of personal individual guilt . . . the prosecution, to discharge
the burden imposed upon it in this case, must establish by
competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual
defendant was either a participant in the illegal act or that,
being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it.”74
The court found that “[n]o corporation has ever been subject to any form
of liability (whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary
international law of human rights.”75 The NMT did not impose liability on
Farben, but, rather, prosecuted its management.76 Based upon its analysis of
the NMT and other international tribunals, Kiobel held that a corporation (as
opposed to natural persons) cannot have liability under international law.77
The Kiobel court then examined treaties and noted that international
treaties may offer some evidence of international law depending upon how
many nations have ratified such treaties and whether they are customarily
enforced.78 The court conceded the existence of some treaties incorporating
corporate liability.79 However, the court was not persuaded because “that
those treaties impose obligations on corporations in the context of the
treaties’ particular subject matter tells us nothing about whether corporate
liability for, say, violations of human rights, which are not a subject of those
treaties, is universally recognized as a norm of customary international
law.”80 The court found that despite “provisions imposing corporate liability

74
Id. at 135 (quoting United States v. Krauch (The Farben Case), 8 N.M.T. 1081 (1952)
(emphasis added by Kiobel)).
75
Id. at 148.
76
Id. at 135.
77
Id. at 148–49.
78
Id. at 137.
79
Id. at 138.
80
Id.
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in some recent specialized treaties,” these treaties fail to demonstrate that
corporate liability is a norm of international law.81
Kiobel next turned to legal scholarship.82 The court explored the opinions
of two international law experts (who were representing a corporate
defendant in an unrelated case),83 and found their opinions convincing. Each
expert had submitted affidavits in a different ATS litigation and opined that
international law does not recognize corporate liability.84 The majority
opinion also referenced law journal articles and found that the proponents of
corporate liability were either counsel to plaintiffs or expressed the view that
corporate liability was a goal rather than a norm of international law.85
However, the Kiobel court was not unanimous on these issues. The next
section discusses Judge Leval’s vigorous objections to the majority’s no
liability holding.
2. Judge Leval’s Concurrence
Judge Leval joined in dismissing the suit, but for evidentiary reasons.86
Plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants actively or directly participated in
the wrongdoing. Rather, they accused the defendants of aiding and abetting
the conduct.87 Judge Leval, citing to the Second Circuit’s requirement that to
impose secondary liability plaintiffs must establish a that a defendant acted
“with a purpose,” found such evidence lacking.88 He stated:
We recently held in [Talisman] that liability under the ATS
for aiding and abetting in a violation of international human
rights lies only where the aider and abettor acts with a
purpose to bring about the abuse of human rights. Furthermore,
81

Id. at 139.
Id. at 142.
83
The procedural backdrop to the Kiobel opinion is unconventional. See Giannini &
Farbstein, supra note 6, at 120 n.1 (describing the procedural backdrop of Kiobel). The court
addressed the issue sua sponte—the issue was neither briefed nor before the Second Circuit.
Id.; see also Erin Foley Smith, Right to Remedies and the Inconvenience of Forum Non
Conveniens: Opening U.S. Courts to Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 44 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 145, 160 (2010) (“The decision came as a surprise to advocates,
particularly because neither party to the case had raised or briefed that particular issue.”). The
Kiobel court relied upon the expert opinions of a corporate defendant in the unrelated
Talisman litigation. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143–44.
84
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143.
85
Id. at 144 nn.47–48.
86
Id. at 153–54 (Leval, J., concurring).
87
Id. at 123 (majority opinion).
88
Id. at 154 (Leval, J., concurring).
82
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the Supreme Court ruled in [Ashcroft v. Iqbal] that a complaint
is insufficient as a matter of law unless it pleads specific facts
supporting a plausible inference that the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s legal rights. Putting together these two rules, the
complaint in this action would need to plead specific facts that
support a plausible inference that the Appellants aided the
government of Nigeria with a purpose to bring about the
Nigerian government’s alleged violations of the human rights
of the plaintiffs. . . . [T]he allegations of the Complaint do not
succeed in meeting that test. I therefore agree with the
majority that the claims against the Appellants must be
dismissed, but not on the basis of the supposed rule of
international law the majority have fashioned.89
Further, Judge Leval disagreed with the majority’s claim that corporations
can have no liability under the statute. He noted that under the holding,
corporations could potentially get away with the most outrageous misconduct
simply by acting in a corporate form.90 Judge Leval argued that the
majority’s position was judge-made rather than a reflection of international
law:
[T]here is no basis for this contention. No precedent of
international law endorses this rule. No court has ever
approved it, nor is any international tribunal structured with a
jurisdiction that reflects it. (Those courts that have ruled on the
question have explicitly rejected it.) No treaty or international
convention adopts this principle. And no work of scholarship
on international law endorses the majority’s rule. Until today,
their concept had no existence in international law.91
He criticized the majority’s reliance on the various international tribunals
saying that those bodies were looking to impose criminal responsibility as
opposed to civil compensation.92 According to the concurrence, a crucial

89

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 149–50 (“According to the rule my colleagues have created, one who earns profits
by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can successfully shield
those profits from victims’ claims for compensation simply by taking the precaution of
conducting the heinous operation in the corporate form.”).
91
Id. at 149–51.
92
Id. at 163.
90
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distinction exists between criminal and civil jurisdiction because
corporations are not the customary focus of criminal punishment.93
In addition, Judge Leval stated that, while international law norms are
established by international law, the method of implementation is not
mandated by international law.94 He commented:
[I]nternational law says little or nothing about how those norms
should be enforced. It leaves the manner of enforcement,
including the question of whether there should be private civil
remedies for violations of international law, almost entirely to
individual nations. While most nations have not recognized
tort liability for violations of international law, the United
States, through the ATS, has opted to impose civil
compensatory liability on violators and draws no distinction in
its laws between violators who are natural persons and
corporations.95
Thus, according to Judge Leval, international law determines whether the
conduct constitutes a violation of international law, but each state, pursuant
to that sovereignty’s domestic law, determines which actors can be
defendants and what rules of enforcement are permitted.96 Since American
tort law controls, and corporations may have liability under U.S. law,
corporations may have liability under the statute. Expectedly, the decision
was contested immediately. The following section describes the post-Kiobel
reverberations.
3. Post-Ruling Procedural Developments in Kiobel
In a 5–5 split, the Second Circuit denied a petition for an en banc
rehearing.97 The dissenting judges stated that “this case presents a significant
issue and generates a circuit split” and referred to Judge Leval’s concurrence
as “scholarly and eloquent.”98 According to the dissenting judges, the twojudge majority opinion in Kiobel was “very likely incorrect as to whether
corporations may be found civilly liable under the [ATS] for violations of

93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 166–67.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 380 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
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such fundamental norms of international law as those prohibiting war crimes
and crimes against humanity.”99
One dissenter, Judge Katzmann, referred to the issue as one “of
extraordinary importance” and added an intriguing element to the dissent.100
He stated that the Kiobel majority’s reliance on his concurring opinion in
Khulumani to support the no-corporate-liability view was wrong.101
According to Judge Katzmann, there is “no inconsistency between the
reasoning of [his] opinion in Khulumani and Judge Leval’s well-articulated
conclusion, with which [he] fully agree[s], that corporations, like natural
persons, may be liable for violations of the law of nations under the
[ATS].”102 The statements of the dissenting judges leave no doubt that they
believe corporations may be liable under the statute.
Plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari;103 the defendant filed its brief in
opposition;104 and plaintiffs filed the reply brief.105 The Court will need to
decide whether to address the corporate liability issue or to defer the
question.
Parallel to the certiorari petition, two appellate court rulings handed down
rulings in the same week that both questioned Kiobel’s analysis and
conclusion. Those two rulings are discussed in the next section.
4. The View from the D.C. and Seventh Circuits: Kiobel Is Wrong
In the aftermath of Kiobel, “[r]umors of corporate liability’s demise in the
context of ATS litigation” were rampant.106 Several scholars sided with
Kiobel’s holding or presumed that it would sway other appellate courts to
rule similarly. For example, Julian Ku noted: “In a blockbuster opinion that
could spell the end of the vast bulk of [ATS] litigation, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that corporations cannot be liable for
violations of customary international law under the [ATS].”107 According to
99

Id.
Id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 380–81.
103
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S.
June 6, 2011), 2011 WL 2326721.
104
Brief of Respondent in Opposition, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2011), 2011 WL
3584741.
105
Reply Brief of Petitioner, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3948605.
106
Joel Slawotsky, Rumors of Corporate Liability’s Demise in the Context of Alien Tort Suits
Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY BLOG (July 20, 2011), http://lcba
ckerblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/guest-essay-joel-slawotsky-rumors-of.html.
107
Julian Ku, Goodbye to the Alien Tort Statute? Second Circuit Rejects Corporate Liability
for Violations of Customary International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2010), http://opiniojuris.o
100
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another scholar, “[t]here’s going to be a huge reduction in [ATS] litigation if
[Kiobel] holds up.”108 Roger Alford opined that “[t]he slow, quiet demise of
the ATS continues. Without further support from the Supreme Court, it
appears that the statute is in free fall.”109 However, two July 2011 cases
suggest that the rumors of the ATS’s demise vis-à-vis corporate liability have
been premature.110
In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber
Co., the court held that corporations may indeed have liability in ATS
suits.111 Describing Kiobel as an “outlier” opinion, the court did not mince
words.112 It stated that the factual premise of the majority opinion in the
Kiobel case is incorrect.113
The court completely disagreed with the Second Circuit and found that
international law had in fact been used by the NMT to punish

rg/2010/09/17/goodbye-to-ats-litigation-second-circuit-rejects-corporate-liability-for-violations-o
f-customary-international-law/.
108
Stephen Bainbridge, No Corporate Liability Under Alien Tort Statute?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbai
nbridgecom/2010/09/no-corporate-liability-under-alien-tort-statute-contrast-citizens-united.html.
109
Roger Alford, Torture by Non-State Actors Not Actionable Under ATS, OPINIO JURIS (June 17,
2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/06/17/torture-by-non-state-actors-not-actionable-under-ats/.
110
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
111
Flomo, 643 F.3d. at 1013. The court also rejected defendant’s argument that the ATS could
not be applied extraterritorially. “Courts have been applying the statute extraterritorially (and not
just to violations at sea) since the beginning; no court to our knowledge has ever held that it
doesn’t apply extraterritorially; and Sosa was a case of nonmaritime extraterritorial conduct yet
no Justice suggested that therefore it couldn’t be maintained.” Id. at 1025. The Flomo ruling
rejecting the extraterritoriality argument makes sense. As referenced infra text accompanying
note 118, it would seem counterintuitive to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality. See
Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute gives
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”). However, the presumption is
rebuttable. As noted by the Supreme Court, to rebut the presumption, plaintiffs are not required
to show that Congress used specific language to the contrary, i.e., that the statute explicitly states
overseas conduct is covered. Plaintiffs can overcome the presumption if the text and/or context
lead to the conclusion that the drafters’ intent was to allow extraterritorial application of the
statute. “Assuredly context can be consulted as well.” Id. at 2883. Both the text and context
support Flomo’s rejection of the extraterritoriality argument. The plain text of the ATS allows
aliens to file claims for violations of international law. Such violations would presumably take
place overseas. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Sosa, the intent of the drafters was to
allow aliens to file claims for several cardinal offenses. One of these paradigmatic offenses is
piracy which occurs outside the borders of the United States. See supra text accompanying note
46. Based upon both the plain text of the ATS and its context, it would be odd if the enactment
of the ATS was done with the intention that it not cover overseas conduct.
112
Flomo, 643 F.3d. at 1017.
113
Id.
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corporations.114 Using uncomplicated words, the court used the following
analogy:
If a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes could be
punished criminally for violating customary international law,
as we believe it could be, then a fortiori if the board of
directors of a corporation directs the corporation’s managers to
commit war crimes, engage in piracy, abuse ambassadors, or
use slave labor, the corporation can be civilly liable.115
The D.C. Circuit, in Doe v. Exxon, also held corporations may indeed
have liability in ATS suits.116 Exxon delivered another blow to Kiobel,
calling the Second Circuit’s Kiobel opinion internally inconsistent and
illogical.117 The court found that the analysis in Kiobel
conflates the norms of conduct at issue in Sosa and the rules for
any remedy to be found in federal common law at issue here;
114

Id.
Id. at 1019. Interestingly, the court noted “the plaintiffs concede that corporate liability
for such violations is limited to cases in which the violations are directed, encouraged, or
condoned at the corporate defendant’s decision making level.” Id. at 1020–21. This suggests
the court had in mind the doctrine of vicarious liability and was leaving open the possibility of
limiting corporate liability to circumstances when directors or senior officers ratify or approve
the wrongful conduct.
116
654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The court initially addressed Exxon’s argument that
the ATS does not apply based upon the presumption against extraterritoriality. “Citing
Morrison, Exxon contends that a ‘strong presumption . . . against extending [federal statutes]
to encompass conduct in foreign territory’ militates against recognizing a common law aiding
and abetting claim based on human rights violations committed in a foreign country.” Id.
at 21 (citation omitted). The court rejected Exxon’s argument citing to the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the TVPA (implicitly endorsing the ability of hearing ATS
claims based upon conduct in foreign countries) and Sosa’s implicit rejection of the
extraterritoriality argument (citing to the U.S. government’s brief in Sosa which no Justice
apparently agreed with). Id. at 26. Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality in
ATS cases does not appear to comport with the intent of Congress. The statute allows aliens
to sue for damages based upon violations of international law which naturally would be
envisioned to take place outside the United States. See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011) (arguing that the presumption
against extraterritoriality should not apply to ATS litigation because the ATS implements
international law which naturally involves foreign nations and is thus distinguishable from
statutes relating to domestic concerns).
117
Exxon, 654 F.3d at 50–55 (noting “a number of problems with the analysis in Kiobel”).
“In sum, the majority in Kiobel not only ignores the plain text, history, and purpose of the
ATS, it rests its conclusion of corporate immunity on a misreading of footnote 20 in Sosa
while ignoring Sosa’s conclusion that federal common law would supply the rules regarding
remedies.” Id. at 54–55.
115
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even on its own terms, its analysis misinterprets the import of
footnote 20 in Sosa and is unduly circumscribed in examining
the sources of customary international law.118
Citing both scholar Louis Henkin and Judge Edwards’ concurrence in
Tel-Oren,119 the Exxon court concluded that international law itself provides
no remedies for its violations.120 Rather, individual nations are to determine
whether and how such violations should be addressed.121 The court stated:
[T]he ATS provides federal jurisdiction where the conduct at
issue fits a norm qualifying under Sosa implies that for
purposes of affording a remedy, if any, the law of the United
States and not the law of nations must provide the rule of
decision in an ATS lawsuit.
Consequently, the fact that the law of nations provides no
private right of action to sue corporations addresses the wrong
question and does not demonstrate that corporations are
immune from liability under the ATS.122
The court held the domestic remedy for violations of international law is
left for the individual nations and that, therefore, the ATS may be used to
enforce international law norms.123 According to Exxon, Kiobel is inherently
contradictory inasmuch as the Kiobel majority concedes that individuals
from a corporation may have liability. If, as the court in Kiobel admits,
individuals have liability, then a juridical entity may also have liability.124
The decision is noteworthy in that in broad terms, it embraces the ATS
plaintiffs’ bar arguments that corporations may have liability under
international law citing to the physical destruction and confiscation of
corporate assets of Farben by the Allied forces after World War II.125

118

Id. at 41.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
120
Exxon, 654 F.3d at 41–42.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 42.
123
Id. at 54–55.
124
Id. at 55.
125
Id. at 52–53; see also id. at 52 n.42 (citing Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of
Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1239 (2009)) (noting in the Nuremberg process indicates that
corporations are not liable for violations of international law).
119
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Both the Flomo and Exxon opinions sharpen the circuit split with Kiobel
and support the need for court-ordered resolution of the corporate liability
question. Given the significance of the issue, it is likely the Supreme Court
will have to provide much-needed guidance. In the following Part, the
Article explains why corporations should be liable under the ATS.
III. DO CORPORATIONS HAVE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS?
Both courts and parties have presumed that the statute is applicable to
corporations. For example, both Yahoo! and Shell Oil settled ATS suits filed
against them.126 On the other hand, Chevron proceeded to trial and obtained
a defense verdict.127 Drummond Corporation also proceeded to trial and
obtained a defense verdict.128 These defendants presumed corporations may
have liability under the ATS or they would have moved for dismissal. Yet as
Kiobel ruled, and some scholars opine, corporations ought not to have
liability under the ATS. Notwithstanding this opposition, as the next section
discusses, the historical record is void of evidence supporting that position.
A. The Absence of Proof That the Drafters Intended to Exclude
Corporations
There is nothing in the ATS itself, in any congressional amendments, or
in the historical record to indicate such a restrictive view of the statute.
Since corporations were in existence at the time the ATS was enacted,129 and
126
Corporations have settled cases and gone to trial presumably based on the premise that a
corporate defendant may have liability under the statute. See, e.g., Mouawad, supra note 12
(describing a settlement paid by Shell in order to avoid a trial where allegations of their
involvement in the murder of a pro-environmentalist were at issue); Rampell, supra note 9
(detailing a large settlement paid by Yahoo! in order to avoid a trial where allegations of their
involvement in giving the Chinese government dissident information were at issue).
127
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (“These plaintiffs
brought claims under the [ATS], Nigerian law, and California law. The jury rendered a
verdict in favor of Chevron on all claims, and Plaintiffs now appeal. . . . We . . . affirm the
district court’s judgment.”).
128
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ne claim for relief
that Drummond aided and abetted the killings, which were war crimes, remained. At a trial of
that claim, the jury returned a verdict for Drummond. . . . We affirm.”).
129
For a similar rationale, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876,
926–27 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The lack of a textual exception for speech by
corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such organizations did not exist or did not
speak. To the contrary, colleges, towns and cities, religious institutions, and guilds had long
been organized as corporations at common law and under the King’s charter . . . . The dissent
offers no evidence—none whatever—that the First Amendment’s unqualified text was
originally understood to exclude such associational speech from its protection.”).
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the ATS did not exclude corporations, one could infer the statute was not
intended to exclude corporations.130
Moreover, the purpose of the statute was to provide redress in the federal
courts for aliens who had suffered a violation of their rights under
international law. Conferring immunity on corporations conflicts with this
purpose. For example, from its enactment, the ATS was applied to some
private actors, such as pirates.131 To distinguish between a private individual
engaged in piracy and a corporation engaged in the same misconduct does
not advance the statute’s goals.
Supporting the view that corporations may have liability is an Attorney
General position cited by Sosa which clearly envisioned corporate plaintiffs.
Sosa referenced the 1795 Attorney General opinion of William Bradford:
Bradford . . . was asked whether criminal prosecution was
available against Americans who had taken part in the French
plunder of a British slave colony in Sierra Leone. Bradford
was uncertain, but he made it clear that a federal court was
open for the prosecution of a tort action growing out of the
episode: “But there can be no doubt that the company or
individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility
have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States;
jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the law of
nations, or a treaty of the United States . . . .”132
Under this opinion, corporations could be plaintiffs in a civil action filed
pursuant to the ATS. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that corporations
have a right to sue under the statute, finding congressional intent in
authorizing “aliens” to be plaintiffs in ATS suits included corporations as
well.133 It would be surprising if corporations wielded the advantage of

130

For a review of historical references in U.S. law demonstrating that international law was
not “limited” to natural persons and, in fact, includes private corporations, see Jordan J. Paust,
NonState Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 977, 985–89 (2011).
131
See Martha Lovejoy, Note, From Aiding Pirates to Aiding Human Rights Abusers:
Translating the Eighteenth-Century Paradigm of the Law of Nations for the Alien Tort Statute,
12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241, 243 (2009) (noting liability to entities that helped pirates).
132
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004) (first emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
133
Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898) (holding that the term “aliens” in the
Judiciary Act has “always been held by this [C]ourt to include corporations”).
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being a plaintiff while simultaneously enjoying immunity from suit.134 As
the Supreme Court has held, “The [ATS] by its terms does not distinguish
among classes of defendants . . . .”135
Corporate liability is ever more sensible today. Corporations wield
enormous power in our globalized, free enterprise-oriented world. “The
‘Corporation’ assumes a central position in modern economic life. This is
due mainly to the fact that major portions of our economic activities are
performed by corporations.”136 Based on Supreme Court precedent that the
ATS does not distinguish between classes of defendants, the failure of
Congress to amend the statute, and the failure of the statute to explicitly
exclude corporations, there is a complete absence of any indication that the
intent of the drafters was to exclude corporate liability. The next section will
examine whether the Sosa decision really obligates courts to review
international law in ascertaining whether corporations can have liability.
B. Do Courts Need to Examine the Question of Whether Corporations May
Have Liability Under International Law?
Kiobel relies substantially on the Sosa footnote for the proposition that
courts must consult international law to ascertain whether a given defendant
may be sued under the ATS.137 As the following section discusses, this
interpretation of the footnote is incorrect.
1. Sosa Does Not Require Courts to Examine International Law to
Determine Whether a Corporation Can Be a Defendant
Opponents of corporate liability argue that, according to a footnote in the
Sosa ruling,138 the question of corporate liability is controlled by
international law and that, pursuant to same, there is no recognition of
corporate liability. The Kiobel court adopted this view and used it as a
linchpin in their recent decision.139 However, the footnote does not explicitly
134

And according to the 1907 opinion of Attorney General Charles Bonaparte, a corporation
could be sued under the statute. Mexican Boundary–Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op.
Att’y Gen. 250, 252–53 (1907).
135
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989).
136
Zohar Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli
Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 99 (1998).
137
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2010).
138
See Ku, supra note 6, at 392 (“The Sosa Court made it clear that the courts hearing ATS
claims must determine whether international law contains a universally accepted rule and
defines that rule specifically and uncontroversially to include defendant’s alleged conduct.”).
139
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127–31.
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state or imply that an issue existed regarding whether a corporation has
liability under international law. Rather, the Court held in Sosa that
international law controls the question of whether the specific conduct
alleged gives rise to liability if the defendant is a private nonstate actor.140
The context of the footnote and the reference to the D.C. Circuit’s Tel-Oren
opinion make it clear that the Court was not questioning the viability of suing
corporations. In footnote 20 the Court states: “A related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a
given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a corporation or individual.”141
The context of the Sosa footnote demonstrates that Kiobel’s reliance on it
is misplaced. The footnote itself cites to the Tel-Oren ruling.142 In a
concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards grappled with the question
of whether torture conducted by a nonstate actor was cognizable under the
statute.143 After consulting sources of international law, Edwards asserted
that a private terrorist organization could not be sued under the statute for
torture since torture was not a jus cogens offense and that, therefore, only a
state actor could be liable for such conduct.144 Edwards argued that since
international law imposes obligations on private parties for jus cogens
violations and because torture had not risen to the level, the nonstate actor
terrorist entity was not liable.145 Judge Edwards did not distinguish between
a juridical person, such as a terrorist organization or corporation, and a
private individual.146 Such a distinction would be illogical. The only issue is
whether the actor is public or private (the latter encompassing individuals
and organizations, such as corporations). Sosa’s footnote stated that courts
should examine international law to determine whether nonstate actors, such
as corporations, have liability for the specific misconduct alleged.147 The
footnote, in fact, supports the view that corporations may have liability since
corporations are included as a type of private actor defendant within the
scope of the statute.148
Therefore, the Sosa footnote stands for the proposition that whether a
private actor (including a corporation) has liability for the specific conduct
(as opposed to requiring a state actor) is governed by international norms.
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20.
Id.
Id.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 794–95 (Edwards, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20.
Id.
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This is hardly remarkable or surprising as courts have long held that, to
determine whether a specific tortious act is cognizable under the statute,
international law must be consulted.149 Such a holding makes perfect sense.
Federal courts must consult customary international law to determine
whether a violation of international law did in fact occur and this may
depend on whether the actor was private (i.e., an individual or a corporation)
or whether a state committed the act. The next section will discuss whether
it is U.S. domestic law or international law that controls America’s domestic
enforcement of international law norms.
2. Under International Law, States Implement and Enforce Standards of
International Law According to Their Own Domestic Legal Systems
International law does not delineate the means of its domestic
enforcement.150
As Judge Leval stated in his Kiobel concurrence,
international law does not provide for, let alone mandate, the particular
domestic implementation of liability for violations of international law.151
Under international law, enforcement responsibilities lie with the sovereign
and individual nations to establish the specific remedies to enforce
international law. As an example of this principle, the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism states:
Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal
principles, shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal
entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to
be held liable when a person responsible for the management
or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed
an offence set forth in article 2. Such liability may be
criminal, civil or administrative.152
Another example is the U.N. Convention Against Corruption.153 This
international convention provides for a domestic remedy for punishing acts
of corruption. According to Article 38:
149

See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
See Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6, at 124 (“Compliance and enforcement should not
be conflated with the existence of the norm in question . . . . In contrast to the international
norms, enforcement has traditionally been left to the domestic arena.”).
151
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J.,
concurring).
152
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 5(1),
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (emphasis added).
153
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
150
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Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation
between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its
public officials, and, on the other hand, its authorities
responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal
offences.154
These provisions corroborate Judge Leval’s view that international law
provides for the nations to enforce international law according to their
particular domestic principles.
Judge Edwards’ concurring opinion in Tel-Oren supports this position.
Addressing Judge Bork’s claim that the Tel-Oren plaintiffs could not sue
absent a “right” to sue granted by international law, Judge Edwards noted
that Judge Bork had absolutely no authority for this position.155 Judge
Edwards stated the “lack of evidence [supporting this position] is not
surprising, because it is clear that international law itself . . . does not require
any particular reaction to violations of law . . . . Whether and how the United
States wished to react to such violations are domestic questions.”156
Judge Edwards continued:
The law of nations thus permits countries to meet their
international duties as they will. In some cases, states have
undertaken to carry out their obligations in agreed-upon ways,
as in a United Nations Genocide Convention, which commits
states to make genocide a crime or in bilateral or multilateral
treaties. Otherwise, states may make available their municipal
laws in the manner they consider appropriate. As a result, the
law of nations never has been perceived to create or define the
civil actions to be made available by each member of the
community of nations; by consensus, the states leave that
determination to their respective municipal laws. Indeed, given
the existing array of legal systems within the world, a
consensus would be virtually impossible to reach—particularly
on the technical accoutrements to an action—and it is hard

154

Id. art. 38 (emphasis added).
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
156
Id. at 777–78 (citations omitted).
155
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even to imagine that harmony ever would characterize this
issue.157
Since international law does not articulate, let alone obligate, the manner
of its domestic enforcement, to read the Sosa footnote as preventing the ATS
from enforcing international law vis-á-vis corporations seems
counterintuitive at best. Given the impossibility of achieving a consensus on
its implementation, holding the ATS inapplicable to a corporation acts to
defeat the goals of international law. If a corporation cannot be held liable
for violations of international law, the goals of international law are
thwarted.
Accordingly, international law determines whether the specific conduct
alleged is of a sufficiently definitive character to constitute a violation of
international law. The domestic law of the United States controls the
procedural aspects of its enforcement. The United States allows corporate
liability for tortious conduct, and, therefore, a corporation may be liable for
violating international law in a suit filed under the ATS.
C. Do Corporations Have Obligations Under International Law?
The ATS is a civil tort statute, and, as such, the issue of corporate
criminal liability does not control the question of whether corporations have
civil liability. However, since Kiobel and other opponents of such liability
reference criminal law, this Article addresses such liability. Aside from
being irrelevant, reliance on criminal law is misplaced because corporate
actors are increasingly the subject of criminal liability. One scholar has
commented that “there is no support for the claim that corporate criminal
liability is so outmoded or anomalous that it should be eliminated,” but rather
that its use is increasing in frequency.158
With respect to civil liability, a venerable international law treatise stated
that corporations do have obligations under and are subject to international
law: “Private individuals, or public and private corporations may . . . become
the subjects of [international] law in regard to rights growing out of their
international relations with foreign sovereigns and states, or their subjects
and citizens.”159 This landmark treatise from a leading scholar is crystal
clear and supports the conclusion that international law encompasses liability
for corporations and private individuals as it does for states.
157

Id. at 778 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1481, 1493 (2009).
159
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (6th ed. 1855).
158
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1. Criminal Liability
Opponents of corporate liability correctly note that international criminal
tribunals have not sought to prosecute juridical entities. This lack of
prosecution is offered as proof that international law does not recognize
corporate responsibility.160 Accordingly, this fact is proffered as the reason
that international tribunals have prosecuted individuals but not
corporations.161
The Kiobel majority, relying principally on various international
tribunals,162 found that corporate criminal liability for international law
violations has not been well-established.163 For example, NMT prosecuted
corporate officials for international law crimes as private individuals.164
However, in the NMT, the issue was whether private nonstate actors could
be liable for certain violations such as crimes against humanity and war
crimes.165 The NMT found that international law undeniably applies to
private nonstate actors.166
Kiobel and other corporate liability opponents place great emphasis on
international criminal tribunals. While it can be argued that the issue is not
definitively resolved,167 criminal liability is fundamentally different and the
fact that international criminal law tribunals did not prosecute corporations is
irrelevant168 in the context of corporate civil liability in ATS litigation. The
160
See generally Ku, supra note 6, at 383 (citing to the Rome Statute’s limitation of liability
to individuals). But see Doe v. Exxon, 654 F.3d 11, 36 (2011) (“The Rome Statute, which
created the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), is properly viewed in the nature of a treaty
and not as customary international law.”).
161
Ku, supra note 6, at 383.
162
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 132–37 (2d Cir. 2010).
163
Id. at 138. For a detailed critique of Kiobel’s findings based upon an author’s belief the
decision demonstrated “profound ignorance” and was full of “misinformation” about
international law, see Mamolea, supra note 65, at 100–11.
164
See, e.g., The Zyklon B Case: Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, in 1 L. REP. OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMS. 93 (1947), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/
Law-Reports_Vol-1.pdf (holding German industrialists liable for supplying Zyklon B, a
poisonous gas, to Nazi concentration camps).
165
Id. at 103.
166
Id. at 102; see also United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art. IV, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (“Persons committing
genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals.”).
167
See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 16 (2d ed. 2001) (“It
remains unclear . . . whether international law generally imposes criminal responsibility on
groups and organizations.”).
168
There is a colorable argument that the decision not to prosecute corporations bore no
connection to international law but was undertaken for other reasons such as political and
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ATS is not a law providing for criminal penalties and does not encompass
criminal punishment. The wording of the statute refers to a tort—there is no
reference to criminal conduct.169 Reliance on criminal law is, therefore, not
persuasive, and the fact that international criminal tribunals have not
assessed the criminal liability of corporations is inconsequential.
Another reason to reject the reliance on criminal tribunals is found in the
dynamic explanation proffered by Giannini and Farbstein for why the NMT
failed to prosecute corporations. In their analysis of the NMT, Giannini and
Farbstein explained that the prosecution of Farben was impossible due to the
prior dismantling of the company.170 The company’s assets were confiscated
and compensation was given to injured parties and some manufacturing
facilities were physically destroyed.171 In other words,
The fact that other remedies had already been enacted explains
the Allies’ decision not to prosecute criminally the corporate
entity. . . . This series of actions represents a deliberate and
conscious decision by the Allied Control Council to sanction
severely a juristic entity that had closely collaborated with and
supported the Nazi regime.172
Thus, Farben was given the ultimate sanction—“corporate death.”173 As
noted by Giannini and Farbstein, this ultimate punishment preceded the
criminal prosecutions.174 Thus, corporate liability opponents’ reliance on the
lack of NMT prosecutions is misplaced.
Kiobel’s belief that “[f]rom the beginning . . . the principle of individual
liability for violations of international law has been limited to natural
persons—not ‘juridical’ persons such as corporations” is not without
critics.175 Professor Paust refers to Kiobel’s analysis as “manifest error” that
led to the wrong holding.176 Historically, in contrast to the United States,177
international strategic motives. See Mamolea, supra note 65, at 92 (claiming that corporations
were not prosecuted by the NMT due to political and legal expediency).
169
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only . . . .” (emphasis added)).
170
Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 6, at 129.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 129–30.
173
Id. at 129.
174
Id. at 130 (“To contend that the lack of charges against the corporation indicates anything
about corporate liability under international law ignores the simple fact that it made little
sense to sue [Farben], given the penalties already imposed and the reality that [Farben’s]
remaining assets were held by the Allied Control Council itself by that time.”).
175
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).
176
Paust, supra note 130, at 977 n.1, 978 n.2.
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various continental European nations’ legal regimes excluded corporations
from criminal liability preferring to impose liability on individuals as
opposed to a legal body, such as a corporation.178 But, as corporations have
become more embedded in our globalized world, this view has already
changed.179 Professor Lederman describes the shift:
The last two decades have created a new socio-politicaleconomic reality, characterized by a thriving common market
in Europe, changes in the political regimes of Eastern Europe,
intensive privatization processes in many countries that shifted
many areas of activity to the non-governmental sector, and the
creation of mega-multinational-corporations that are the result
of acquisitions, mergers and takeovers. In a process that
peaked in the second half of this century, legal bodies have
actually assumed control of all forms of commerce and
industry, to the extent that no economic endeavor is deemed
possible without their involvement. This socio-economic
reality has dictated, to a large extent, the change in the law’s
approach to the imposition of penal liability on corporations.
Policy setters in various legislative and law enforcement
bodies sensed that attaining effective, and mainly trouble-free,
control of the economy through criminal law depends on a
sweeping subordination of the legal bodies themselves, as far
as possible, to criminal proceedings.
All this without
restricting the scope of the personal criminal liability
incumbent on management ranks or on those actually involved
in breaking the law.180
In short, the realities of our interconnected world and the immense
financial power wielded by large corporations militate strongly in favor of

177
The fact that U.S. law permits such liability provides yet an additional reason for the
irrelevancy of the criminal law tribunals. As discussed, international law leaves to the
individual states the specific means of its enforcement. Moreover, the domestic laws of the
United States permit corporate liability. See supra Part II.B.2. Thus, reference to
international tribunals is misplaced.
178
Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and
Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641,
643 (2000).
179
See, e.g., Beale, supra note 158, at 1493 (“[S]everal European jurisdictions that
previously made no provision for corporate criminal liability have created such liability, and
others have expanded existing bases of corporate liability for crimes.”).
180
Lederman, supra note 178, at 644 (emphasis added).
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subjecting corporate conduct to criminal liability. For example, over twenty
years ago, the Council of Europe181 recognized this need and recommended
the adoption of corporate criminal liability in European Community
nations.182 Further, the Netherlands had already commenced allowing
corporate criminal liability before the European Council recommendation,
while others subsequently adopted the change.183
As Professor Lederman notes, “The Dutch courts had seemingly
anticipated this recommendation and, in the mid-1970s, shifted course in this
direction. France, on the other hand, changed its criminal law on this issue
following the recommendation, and in the early 1990s erased the prohibition
against rendering corporations (personnes morales) criminally liable.”184
Lederman notes that in the 1990s
legal bodies in England have been charged with manslaughter,
and some have even been convicted . . . . In Israel also, this
struggle has finally been decided. For the first time, an explicit
provision concerning corporate liability has been legislated in
the general section of the criminal code, and the Supreme Court
has stated that “in principle, there is no reason for failing to
impose criminal liability on a corporation for the perpetration
of manslaughter.”185
According to Beale, criminal liability is fast becoming the rule rather than
the exception.186
Beginning in the 1970s, nations throughout western European
[sic] began creating or expanding corporate criminal liability,
rather than contracting or eliminating it. Some of the
legislation affected small nations. For example, legislation in
181
European Council, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-coun
cil/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 31, 2011).
182
Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, Recommendation on Liability of Enterprises
Having Legal Personality for Offences Committed in the Exercise of their Activities,
Recommendation No. R (88) 18 (Oct. 1988).
183
See Lederman, supra note 178, at 645.
184
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
185
Id. at 645–46 (footnote omitted).
186
Beale, supra note 158, at 1493. A significant exception is Germany. However, even in
Germany, corporations may be fined through administrative bodies and supervised by
criminal courts. Moreover, an active debate is underway with scholars arguing for actual
corporate criminal liability. See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in
Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 89, 123–26 (2004).
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the Netherlands and Denmark provided that corporations are, in
general, liable for all offenses within each nation’s general
criminal code. In 1995, Finland imposed a new form of
negligence-based criminal liability on corporations, and in
2003 Switzerland, for the first time, imposed criminal liability
on corporations. But perhaps the most significant legislation
was adopted in 1992 when France enacted a revised penal code
that provided, for the first time, for corporate criminal liability.
More recently, a 2000 amendment effectively expanded the
scope of corporate liability under French law. Additionally,
transnational European organizations have recommended that
their member states provide for criminal or quasi-criminal
liability on organizations for specific types of offenses.187
This emphasis on corporate criminal liability for bribery is exemplified in
the United Kingdom’s anti-bribery law. Pursuant to U.K. law, there is a
separate offense for commercial enterprises for the failure to prevent the
bribery—an offense distinct and separate from the act of bribery itself.188
A “relevant commercial organization”189 is guilty of an offense if a person
associated with the organization bribes another person intending to obtain or
retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for the
organization.190 Pursuant to the U.K. anti-bribery law, corporations are
included in the law.191 Another example is Australia, where corporations
may also have liability.192 Further, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention also
demonstrates an adoption of corporate liability.193
A recent example is the Trafigura case. In June 2010, defendant
corporation Trafigura was fined and held criminally responsible by a Dutch
court for the impermissible dumping of toxic waste.194 The case arose from a
187

Beale, supra note 158, at 1493–94 (footnotes omitted).
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(1) (Eng.).
189
Id. § 7(5) (a “relevant commercial organization” includes U.K corporations and
partnerships as well as corporations and partnerships from anywhere in the world that conduct
business in the U.K.).
190
Id. § 7(1).
191
Id. § 7(5).
192
FOREIGN BRIBERY, AUSTL. GOV’T 4 (2011), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WW
W/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~n0000Info+paper.pdf/$
file/n0000Info+paper.pdf.
193
See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 8, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].
194
Trafigura Found Guilty of Exporting Toxic Waste, BBC (July 23, 2010), http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-10735255.
188
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2006 illegal dumping of toxic waste in the Ivory Coast and the resulting
injuries to thousands of people.195 The injured parties were poisoned from
the waste leading to deaths and serious injuries.196
In the United States, corporate criminal liability has long been recognized
and is well embedded in the American judicial system:
The existence of a corporate compliance program, even one
that specifically prohibited the very conduct in question, does
not absolve the corporation from criminal liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. See United States v. Basic
Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A]
corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust
violations committed by its employees if they were acting
within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and
for the benefit of the corporation, even if . . . such acts were
against corporate policy or express instructions.”).197
Both federal and state courts in the United States routinely have corporate
defendants in their courtrooms defending a variety of criminal prosecutions.
Accordingly, even in the criminal liability context, corporate liability is
increasingly the norm.198 For example, international law recognizes the
importance of corporate responsibility in the areas of terrorist financing and
money laundering.199 With respect to international bribery, there is a strong
global effort toward combating corruption, corporate responsibility, and
liability.200 The preceding section demonstrated the essentially unanimous
195

Id.
Id.
197
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-28.800(B) (2008), available at http://
www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800.
198
See Bert Swart, International Trends Towards Establishing Some Form of Punishment
for Corporations, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 947, 948 (2008) (explaining how international law is
embracing corporate criminal liability).
199
See United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 5(1)(b), G.A.
Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000); OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra
note 193, arts. 1(2), 2; S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (calling on nations
to deny aid to anyone financing terrorism); S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(Sept. 28, 2001) (calling on nations to prohibit terrorist funding); International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, art. 2(1), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) (seeking to criminalize the financing of terrorism).
200
See generally Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 174
(outlining steps to be taken in the civil context in the international fight against corruption);
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173 (outlining steps
to be taken in the criminal context in the international fight against corruption); Group of
States Against Corruption (GRECO), COUNCIL EUR., http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/
196
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trend towards and perhaps norm for the imposition of corporate criminal
liability. The next section explores how corporate liability for civil damages
already exists.
2. Civil Liability
The vast majority of jurisdictions permit civil suits against corporations.
Given that ATS suits against corporations are civil rather than criminal, an
examination of whether corporate civil liability is an accepted norm of
international law is most relevant. Unlike criminal liability, there is no doubt
about a juridical organization’s civil liability for causing tort damage.
In a nutshell, as pointed out by a recent report of the
International Commission of Jurists on corporate complicity in
international crimes, “[i]n every jurisdiction, despite
differences in terminology and approach, an actor can be held
liable under the law of civil remedies if through negligent or
intentional conduct it causes harm to someone else.” Civil
liability therefore gives more latitude than criminal
liability . . . (1) it applies indiscriminately to natural and legal
persons whereas criminal law often restricts the liability of
legal persons; (2) the characterization of a negligent or
intentional conduct is not subject to the principle of legality;
(3) it operates on a lower standard of proof than does criminal
liability and; (4) it offers an independent source of financial
redress for victims.201

greco/general/members_en.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (listing members of GRECO);
ADB/OECD, ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 2 (2001), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/24/35021642.pdf (outlining concerns with corruption and
corporate responsibility); African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
art. 7, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (listing objectives of convention dealing with corruption);
Governance and Anti-Corruption, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER
NAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20040922~menuPK:34480~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.
html (last updated July 2011) (providing an overview of the World Bank’s anti-corruption
protocols); United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 153, at iii–iv (detailing
the reasons for creation of an anti-corruption instrument).
201
Régis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International and Domestic Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 221 (2010) (citation omitted); see also Jordan J. Paust, The Reality of
Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal Process, 25 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 1229, 1237–39 (2004) (describing “universal jurisdiction for criminal or civil sanctions” for
private actors).
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Corporations also enjoy rights and face liabilities under international law
including those arising out of international treaties.202 Illustrative are the
rights conferred by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.203 Indeed, corporations have filed claims
in the European Court of Human Rights for an infringement on corporate
rights.204
One of the most important treaties used frequently by both international
corporations and states are bilateral investment treaties (BITs). These have
become quite prominent in international law. “BITs and similar crossnational instruments, such as Chapter 11 in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (‘NAFTA’), have rapidly proliferated over the past few
decades.”205 Corporations routinely file claims under investment treaties.206
The
[m]ost prominent [forum for these disputes] is the World
Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (‘ICSID’). Many . . . tribunals adopt a relatively
progressive approach in interpreting BIT clauses, intervening
in numerous instances in local regulatory or legislative acts that
are viewed as conflicting with such cross-national legal
norms.207
Corporations’ claims for damages based upon violations of investment
treaties are decided under international law.208 This demonstrates that
202
See Charles M. Spofford, Third Party Judgment and International Economic Transactions,
in 113 RECUEIL DES COURS 117, 177–81 (1964) (utilizing exemplars from international
investment treaty arbitration wherein investor corporations arbitrate against host states for
alleged violations of treaty rights).
203
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
204
See, e.g., Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) (1995) (holding
that in fact the company, and not its shareholders, was the proper rights holder); The Sunday
Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) (holding that legal persons have the right to
freedom of expression).
205
See Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 425, 428 (2010)
(citation omitted); North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1115–1138, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
206
Lehavi, supra note 205, at 449.
207
Id. (citations omitted).
208
See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
para. 70 (Aug. 30, 2000), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestTyp
e=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC542_En&caseID=C155 (“A Tribunal established
pursuant to NAFTA Chapter Eleven, Section B must decide the issues in dispute in accordance
with NAFTA and applicable rules of international law. (NAFTA Article 1131(1)). In addition,
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corporations are invoking international law to their benefit, since the
claimant is alleging a host state’s breach of its international treaty
obligations. For example, in 1999, Methanex Corporation filed claims under
NAFTA against the United States, alleging that California’s MTBE (a
gasoline additive and water contaminant) reduction plan constituted unequal
and unfair treatment and would result in an illegal taking of its “property
right.”209 Although the claim was ultimately denied, Methanex’s claim was
brought as all investment treaty claims are—pursuant to international law.210
The Methanex arbitration tribunal stated:
[Under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice,] Methanex has rightly emphasised the reference in
Article 1131(1) to “applicable rules of international law”, and
in this respect Methanex relies on Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. It provides:.
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of

NAFTA Article 102(2) provides that the Agreement must be interpreted and applied in the light
of its stated objectives and in accordance with applicable rules of international law.”).
209
Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, In the Matter of an International
Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, pt. II, ch. B, para. 19 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://naftac
laims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_Final_Award.pdf.
210
Id. para. 1.
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the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.”211
Thus, investment treaty arbitration panels use international conventions,
customs, and general principles of law as outlined sources of international
law per Article 38(1) and represent a clear example of corporations invoking
international law.212 If a corporation has the right to invoke rights under
international law, a corporation should also be subject to civil liability under
international law. Predictably, with rights come obligations. To confer
rights on corporations without the associated obligations is not reasonable.
Vesting corporations with rights, such as the right to file claims, while
simultaneously exonerating them for tort damage created by violating
international law, does not make sense and, moreover, encourages violation
of international law.
D. The Sharp Line of Demarcation Between States and Corporations No
Longer Exists: The Corporation as a Quasi-Public Actor
Opponents of corporate liability may point to the historical dichotomy
between “corporations” and “states” as underpinning the argument that only
states have obligations under international law. As Professor Alford notes, in
the past international law was relegated to sovereign nations.213 Therefore,
“ ‘sovereign States exclusively are International Persons—i.e. subjects of
International Law’ and neither ‘monarchs, diplomatic envoys, private
individuals . . . churches . . . chartered
companies,
nor . . . organized
wandering tribes’ enjoyed the status of ‘International Persons’ who are
‘subject[s] of the Law of Nations.’ ”214
According to liability opponents, the ATS is only applicable to “states” as
states are the principal actors in “international law.” According to the Kiobel
majority, “customary international law includes only ‘those standards, rules

211

Id. para. 3.
See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.
gov/s/l/c27648.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2011) (“Apotex Inc., a Canadian pharmaceuticals
corporation, alleges that U.S. courts committed errors in interpreting federal law, and that such
errors are in violation of NAFTA Article 1102 (national treatment) and Article 1105
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or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common
good and/or in dealings inter se.’ ”215
In essence, opponents claim that international law is only concerned with
the rights and obligations of states.216 While acknowledging that private
individuals may have obligations for certain conduct, such as war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, a distinction is made between private
individuals and private corporations.217 Describing individual liability for
violations of international humanitarian law as “revolutionary,” Kiobel
explained that international law only concerns state to state relations.218
Even when international law recognizes private actor liability in limited
circumstances it is in the context of states’ obligations to its citizens.219
Therefore, since corporations are private actors and the purpose of
international law is to regulate conduct and relations between states,
corporations cannot have obligations under international law.
However, there is academic disagreement. As noted by Professor Paust:
For centuries, there have been vast numbers of formally
recognized actors in the international legal process other than
the state, although far too many assume incorrectly that
traditional or classical international law had been merely stateto-state and that under traditional international law individuals
and various other nonstate actors did not have rights or duties
based directly in international agreements or customary
international law.220
According to Paust, there exists a significant array of geographically
diverse nonstate actors which have been subject to international law.221 He
215
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describes the attempt to limit obligations to formal states as a “mendacious
myth”222 and cites to various circumstances where nonstate actors have
indeed been subject to international law.223
However, assuming arguendo Kiobel’s reference to international law
governing the corporate liability question is correct, notwithstanding any
traditional relegation of international law to “states,” corporations are now
crucial actors in international business and have taken the mantle of
economic leadership and development once relegated primarily to nation
states. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Citizens United,
corporations are “the principal agents of the modern free economy.”224 This
fact alone militates strongly in favor of rejecting a formalistic “no liability”
view.
In addition, scholars have criticized any distinction as having been
completely wrong. For example, Professor Paust states:
[F]or the last 250 years, international law has not been merely
state-to-state. At best, claims to the contrary have been
profoundly mistaken. At worst, they have been part of layered
lies and attempts by malevolent myth-mongers to exclude and
oppress others, to deny responsibility, or to support radical
revisionist ambitions. A claim that the only actors with formal
participatory roles or recognized rights and duties other than
the state have been natural individual persons is similarly
mistaken. For example, international law [reaches] such nonindividual entities and other actors as a company, corporation,
union, vessel, courthouse, insurgent, belligerent, tribe, free city,
people, and nation, among others.225
Further, as a New York district court noted, “Limiting civil liability to
individuals while exonerating the corporation directing the individual’s
action . . . makes little sense in today’s world.”226
While, traditionally, a line of demarcation existed, that line is becoming
blurred. Corporations are becoming active private actors in the public arena,
taking a role in traditionally state functions. The public functions of
education, policing, and defense operations no longer depend exclusively on
222
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public actors within a specific nation state; they are affected by private
corporations conducting business across borders, often as quasi-public
actors. Indeed, large multinational corporations have been referred to as
virtual “states.”227 As such, there is no reason to treat corporations
differently than states.228
Simultaneously, the private sector functions of providing private liquidity
and capital market investment are no longer the exclusive province of private
entities. States are operating in the business world as private actors through
vehicles such as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), whereby they actively
invest in world equity markets,229 demonstrating convincingly that states are
involved in the private sector. States also own private sector businesses
through State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).230 Thus, the traditional role of the
private sector is no longer relegated exclusively to corporations.
1. Corporations Acting in the Public Sphere
Those with the view that states are the principal actors within their
boundaries must recognize that states often outsource to corporations the
performance of traditionally state services. There are various traditional state
227
See Douglas J. Wood, Say Hello to the World’s New Sovereign Nations: Facebook,
Google and RIM; Nations? Bah, They Can’t Control ME! Welcome to War, Virtual WorldStyle, CORP. COUNS. (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202
475267603 (“Facebook now has more than five hundred million members, a population that
would make it the third-largest nation in the world. Google, used every day by hundreds of
millions, is the most robust resource for knowledge in history, and forever
expanding. . . . Every day, Google, RIM, and Facebook are behaving more like sovereign
nations than corporations—controlling populations, taxing citizens, and passing laws
regulating insiders and outsiders who conduct commerce within their virtual borders. Their
future independence will solidify their sovereignty from unilateral regulation by any other
nation, terrestrial or otherwise. In short, Google, RIM, and Facebook can already act with
relative impunity. Each has sufficient power that it is impossible for any traditional nation to
truly control them.”).
228
See Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European
Perspective, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RIGHTS 262, ¶ 1 (2008), at http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/3 (“Corporations, especially multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’), have
become ever larger and more powerful since the 1970s, often surpassing the economic power
and influence of states.”).
229
Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superpowers: How U.S.
Regulators Should Respond, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1239, 1246–48 (2009) (noting SWFs’
increasing investment in private equity).
230
See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 13 (2010) (“State-owned enterprises (‘SOE’s), newly
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roles which are increasingly being undertaken by private entities including
the. These roles span the gamut, including health care, welfare, education,
prisons, police, imprisonment, military defense, and other traditional
governmental services.231 Historically state roles have been replaced by
corporations and the depth of outsourcing of public functions is receiving
increased attention.232 “The most common form of privatization in this arena
has been outsourcing, an arrangement in which the government contracts
with a private entity to render goods or services previously provided by the
government.”233
The privatization of prisons serves as an example of this
outsourcing phenomenon. Prisons are no longer the exclusive
domain of the state. Commencing in the 1980s and 1990s,
“governments began to rely more heavily upon the private
sector for the provision of corrections services for adults. As a
result, a significant number of state and federal prisoners are
now in the custody of private entities.”234
Indeed, corporations are influential in shaping decisions of nation
states.235 One scholar notes, “The world has . . . changed, and long-standing
legal concepts are being increasingly challenged by dramatic cross-border
developments that no longer allow domestic land laws to exist in isolation,
but instead present pressing issues of cross-influences, regionalism, and
universalism.”236
Although states were once the primary vehicle to impose obligations, now
corporations are taking a substantial role. An example “is the manner in
which the enforcement of human rights in the crucial area of labour rights is
moved from states and international organizations to market actors via the
idea of [corporate social responsibility].”237
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Another example is governmental outsourcing to corporations of drafting
health policy and regulations. For example, the U.K. has asked food
corporations to assist drafting policy on food and alcohol.238
In addition to wielding enormous economic power,
corporations increasingly engage in state-like activity as a
result of the privatization of traditional state functions (e.g., the
management of prisons, public welfare programs, public
utilities, and wars) and the tendency of corporations to elect to
operate in environments where state power is weak or nonexistent.239
Given the fact that corporations are acting much like public actors it
would be unfair if a private actor could obtain immunity for civil damages by
virtue of it being a corporate entity. There would also be substantial
incentive for misconduct if the actor knows there is an exemption of civil
liability.240 Indeed, as noted by Tyler Giannini and Susan Farbstein, the
Kiobel holding “potentially incentivizes states to abdicate state duties to
corporations because incorporation may effectively insulate all parties—
states, armed groups, and corporations—from liability.”241
2. States Acting in the Private Sphere
A similar shift has occurred in the private sector. The historical activities
of the private sector, including investment in the equity and debt markets, the
ownership of shares in other private sector corporations, and providing
investment capital, are no longer solely the role of the private corporation.242
States are increasingly taking on a private actor role.243 The emergence of
SWFs as financial superstars is one example. SWFs, and their state owners,
238
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are increasingly acquiring ownership stakes in corporations all over the
globe.244
Whether a SWF controls, dominates, or outright buys a
corporation, there can be no doubt that such activity represents involvement
in a traditionally nonstate activity resulting in states conducting business as
private actors.
Another example of the blurring of the demarcation is the SOE, which is
often a corporate entity.245 SOEs are involved in direct or partial ownership
of business projects and joint venture partnerships with other states and
corporations on a global basis.246 Again, this constitutes a form of traditional
private corporate activity being conducted by states as private actors
conducting business on an international scale.
Since states are engaging in private actor functions the distinctions
between states and corporations are eviscerating.
Accordingly, the
theoretical underpinning for holding only states as bearing international legal
obligations has similarly been largely eliminated:
This participation of states directly in markets (production,
ownership, finance and the like) is not merely in the old and
now fairly tame form of public, central planning-based,
political regimes, or the sort of ownership that traditionally
constituted state enterprises, i.e. mercantilist/MarxistLeninist undertakings with a long and well understood history
and purpose. What distinguishes this sovereign activity from
its mid-20th Century form is the willingness of states not only
to limit their control of internal economies, but also to invest
their financial wealth outside their national borders. In this
respect, states assume the very role of the private economic
actors that they once feared so much. The 21st Century is
witnessing a dramatic rise in the willingness of states to project
economic power both at home and in host states through the
same economic vehicles that threatened the states’ power in the
20th Century. The facilitating cause of this change in
approach is the creation of the very system that frees economic
actors from the constraints of territory and more closely binds
public actors thereto. Just as private economic entities may
now cross borders to affect transactions that maximize their
wealth, so states are now discovering that they might do the
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same thing. Economic globalization does not exclude private
market participants from its system of freely moving capital.
Just as private actors are subject to the regulation and control of
the sovereign in whose territories they act, states acting outside
their borders as participants in local economic activity assume
a similar character. Consequently, some states seem to have
become, to some extent, pools of national economic wealth, the
power of which matches or exceeds their traditional sovereign
power.247
Thus, the roles of corporations as purely private actors and that of states
as purely public actors are no longer in effect.248 Each distinct role has been
replaced with a mixed role. Given the reality of corporations being wealthier
than states, our interconnected and interdependent world, and the blurring of
the distinction of roles between states and corporations, the failure to impose
obligations upon corporations because corporations are distinct from states is
no longer valid. “Traditional legal concepts are thus being exceedingly
challenged by recent geopolitical, economic, and intellectual factors that no
longer allow land laws to exist in isolation. Rather, these challenges present
pressing issues of strong cross-influences, regionalism, and universalism.”249
The mixture of state and corporate roles unquestionably prevents states from
being purely public actors and prevents corporations from being purely
private actors. To impose legal obligations on states but disallow these same
obligations on corporations is makes little sense in today’s world where both
states and corporations have similar or even identical interests. This
coalition of interests underscores the blurring of the distinction between
states and corporations.
In international relations, there are no enduring values as in the
case of interpersonal relations. For states, there are mostly
shifting interests of a passing nature. The states’ goals of
power and wealth are in frequent contrast with the human goals
of justice and peace aspirations. The protagonists of state
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interests all too often prevail over those advocating justice and
peace.250
Similar to state interests, corporations also have no enduring values other
than goals of financial power and wealth. Why should corporations be
treated differently particularly in today’s global economy where states act in
the private realm and private corporations do so in the public arena? There is
a lack of compelling reasons supporting the view that courts should treat
corporations differently so as to exempt them from liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the evolving notion of states as private actors and the implications
for private corporations, the Supreme Court will need to address the issue at
some point. Because of the circuit split and the importance of corporate
liability, the Court may very well accept review of Kiobel or, alternatively,
may grant cert in a different ATS suit, such as Exxon or Flomo, particularly
if the court wants to address corporate liability alongside the issue of the
standard for secondary liability.
The high stakes and significance of the corporate liability issue increase
the likelihood that the Supreme Court will accept at least one corporate suit
to resolve the liability question. Substantial support exists for the view that
corporations should be liable under the ATS. These reasons include: the
dearth of proof that corporate defendants were excluded by the statute’s
drafters; the Kiobel court’s misplaced reliance on the Sosa footnote; the lack
of an enforcement mandate in international law; that corporations are subject
to civil law and criminal law; and the blurring of the once sharp publicprivate distinction. All of these points undermine the argument that
international law is relegated only to states, and that the Court should,
therefore, reject corporate immunity in ATS suits.
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